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guardian, ad, liten, VINTON
G. STEINER,
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Corrunission, and Department of
Public Highways, arrl NEPHI
CITY CORPORATION, a political
Sub-division of the State of
Utah,

12531

Defendants.

----------APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for per'sonal injur-

ies arising out of an auto-pedestrian
1

accident occuring on defendants highway
City Street in which the minor
plaintiff suffered personal injuries.
DISPOSITION OF·
LOWER COURT
Motions to Dismiss were granted by
the Honorable C. Nelson Day, District

Judge.

Further Motions To. ,Dismiss

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint were
granted by the Honorable J. Harlan Burns,
District Judge.

From those Orders,

plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON
APPEAL
Plaintiff's ask that the trial Courts
Orders granting the Defendant's Motions
for Dismissal be reversed, and that the
Defendant's be joined as parties to the
legal action here in, and required to answe-r
the Second Amended Complaint of the

Plaintiff and defend herein.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
That on the 29th day of September,

\ 1967, the plaintiff, Kimala Steiner, then

I

a minor child of 13 years of age, while
crossing State Highway and U.S. Highway 91,
as it traverses Nephi City and fonns the
main street of Nephi City, was struck by
an automobile driven by a defendant,
Cathleen Carter.

The minor child was

seriously injured and was immediately
hospitalized for a period of over 30 days.
Plaintiff's herein allege that a proximate
cause of the accident and the injuries
rustained by said minor child was the
negligence of the State of Utah in managing
the application of the new surface to the

roadway upon which the accident occurred,
and al so the 1 ight ing fix tu res attached

thereto.

And the negligence of Nephi City

Corporation for its management of the

3

roadway upon which the accident occurred
and the lighting fixtures adjacent there to.
Claim for damages arising from the accident was filed with Nephi City Corporation,
within the 90 days of occurrance, and
claim against the State of Utah was filed
with the attorney general and State Road
Commission within one year of the date of
the accident.

Each of the claims were

denied and thereafter, the plaintiff's
instituted legal action in the Fifth
Judicial District Court in and for Juab
County, State of Utah.

Upon the initiat-

ion of the legal action, the defendant,.
Nephi City Corporation filed a Motion to
Dismiss (R-16) based upon Section 10-7-77
Utah Code Annotated (1953) alleging that
the plaintiff's had failed to file their
claim with Nephi City Corporation within
30 days of the accident.

4
'

The State of Utah

I

filed a Motion to Dismiss (R-15) based

I

I

I the

t'

t

failed to file a written undertaking at
time of filing the complaint herein.

The facts show that such undertaking had

of November, and a written undertaking had
been filed on that date.

Hearing upon the

Motions were had before the Honorable C.
Nelson Day, District Judge, on the 12th
day of November, 1968.

At which time,

District Judge indicated that he was pur-

suaded to grant the Motions to Dismiss,
but that he would grant the plaintiff
time in which to file objections and
memorandums regarding the plaintiff's
Position, and the Court granted permission

5

to plaintiff to file an Amended Compl-

aint.

(Transcript on hearing of Nov-

ember 12, 1968).

Thereafter,. the parties,

in accordance with the instructions of
· the Court, submitted rremorandums (R 26 &

37) regarding their position on the MRtions
·to Dismiss, and on the 12th day of Decem-

ber, 1968, the Court entered its Orders

(R 46 &48) dismissing the action of the
plaintiff against the State of Utah and
against Nephi City Corpora ti on.

Thereafter

I within a one year period, the plaintiff
I

i

\filed its Second Amended Complaint. (R-50)
i

I The defendants, State of Utah and Nephi .
I

ICity

Corporation thereupon filed their

j Motions to Dismiss (R 66 & 68) alleging

I prior adjudication.

Imotions

Hearing upon these

was had before the Honorable James

P, McCune, District Judge, and thereafter
re-heard by tre Honorable J. Harlan Burns,

6

District Judge.

On the 12th day of

April, 1971, the Honorable J. Harlan Burns

entered his Order (R-86) granting the
defendant's Motions to Dismiss.

Plaintiff

moved for re-hearing (R-84) which was
denied. (R 93 & 95).
POINTS URGED FOR REVERSING
FULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
1.

Valid claims for personal injur-

ies arising f ram accidents occurring upon,
and because of their dangerous condition,

the streets of a Municiple Corporation,
continue, where proper facts exist, for
more than 30 days after the occur.rence, .
and the 30 day notice requirement found in

· Section 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
is not mandatory in all circumstances.
2.

That a municiple Corporation may

be estopped from asserting the 30 day

requirement found in Section 10-7-77, Utah

7

Code Annotated (1953), by reason of the
conduct of the governing officers of said
Corporation.
3.

An Order of Dismissal, citing a

plaintiff's failure to file simultaneous

with their complaint, a written undertaking
required by Section 63-30-19, Utah Code
Annotated (1953), is not an adjudication
upon the merits, with prejudice, and the
filing of an Amended Complaint is not
, precluded thereby.
4.

I Judge,
I given

Permission, granted by a District
to file an Amended Complaint , when

for good cause and upon application

of a plaintiff, cannot thereafter be
i

denied by another District Judge, who has

· replaced the Judge granting such permission.

I

ARGUMENT
1,

Section 10-7-77, Utah Code

I Annotated,

I

(1953)

8

provides,

"Every claim against a city or
incorporated town for damages or
injury, alleged to have been caused
by the defective unsafe, dangerous,
obstructed condition of any street,
alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert,
or bridge of such city or town, or
from the negligence of the city or
town authorities in respect to any
such street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge, shall within thirty days after the happening
of such injury or damage be presented
to the Board of Commissioners •••• "
The facts in the instant case indicate
that the minor child, Kimala Steiner,

suffered injuries on the street of the
!I

Defendant, Nephi City Corporation, on the

'

: 29th day of September, 1967.

And that she

, was continously hospitalized to the 8th
1 day of November, 1967, a period of forty

I

Ten days past the thirty day claim

days.

period,
During this time, City Councilmen and
r City Attorney ard City Manager of Nephi

I

City were aware of this accident and that

I

9

injuries were suffered.

This is shown by

the minutes of the Nephi City Council
meeting of October 2, 196 7. (R-42). Which
minutes read as follows:
"The Mayor mentioned to the council
the two accidents which had happened
on the newly surfaced highway •••• "
And al so by the meeting of the plaint-

iff's Attorney with the City Attorney,
described in plaintiff's affidavit. (R-35).
It is the contention of the plaintiff
that where the officers of the Municiple
Corpora ti on knew that an accident had
occurred upon city streets, that a claim
for damages was being considered, that the
injured party was a minor child, and that

I hsopitalization
t

of the injured party

continued without interruption for more
than thirty days following the accident,
that the

day requirement does not

require strict application and that the

10

reasoning of the Court in the case of
Spencer -vs- Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d
361, 412 P. 2d 449, (1966) applies where

the Court said:

"in such circumstances as this, it
is the duty of the Court to look to
the substance rather than to technical it ie s, in order that plaintiff
may have fair adjudication of her
claim period ••••

2.

The Municiple Corporation, Nephi

. City, may be estopped, by virtue of the

\conduct of its officials, from asserting
I

; the thirty day requirement found in Section·

I

110-7-77,

Code Annotated, (1953), 56

Jur 2d, 799 (1963) in Section No. 793
provides:
" •••• in some jurisdictions 1 the Courts
have held that under certain circumstances the governing body of the
municipality could waive the statutory requirement of notice, or by the
conduct of its officers or governing
body, estopp itself from asserting
failure to
the notice as a
defense ••••
11

see also Rice -vs- Granite School District
23 Utah 2d 22,

--P. 2d---

(1969).

In the circumstances at bar, the uncootested facts of plaintiff's affidavit,
1

(R-35) show that within 30 days of the date

I of

the accident, Milton T. Harmon, Plaint-

iff's Attorney, had a conference with Mr.

Udell R. Jensen, Nephi City Attorney, who
was then acting as Nephi City Attorney,
am that during the course of the conversation, the substance of the claim of the
plaintiff's were discussed.

And in addit-

ion the statutory provisions, under Utah
Law, regulating the filing of claims

against Municiple Corporations was also

discussed.

That at said time, plaintiff's

attorney had not personally examined the
statutes of the State of Utah, regulating

the period of time in which claim should
be presented, an:l that said Udell R. Jensen

12

represented that he had so examined the
said statutes, and upon examination, it
was his understanding, and he so represented to plaintiff's attorney, that claims
:·against Muni.ciple Corporations arising out

I of

the facts presented herein, and which

were then discussed, were to be made within
·a ninety day period following the date of
the accident •

The plaintiff contends that under such
circumstances, the defendant Nephi City
Corporation, is estopped from asserting
the thirty day requirement.

3.

Section 63-30-19, Utah Code

Annotated, (1953) provides as follows:
"At the time of the f i 1 ing of the
action, the plaintiff shall file an
undertaking in a sum fixed by th=
Court, but in no case less than the
sum of $300.00, conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of taxable
costs incurred by the governmental
entity in the action if the P.laint iff
13

fails to prosecute the actionli or
fails to recover judgment .••• '
The undertaking in this matter was
not filed on the date of the filing of
the complaint.

But was filed

simul-

taneously with filing of the First Amended
Complaint in this matter, which was on the
12th day of November, 1968.

At which time

th= first hearing of this matter was had

before the Honorable C. Nelson Day.

The

Court then indicating his decision to
grant the defendants Motions to Dismiss.
At this time, the plaintiff cal led to
the Court's attention, the fact that an
undertaking had been filed.

The question

of the undertaking was specifically discussed, with the Court.

The Court at

that time, indicated that it could see no
reason why the pla:irtiff should not >be allowed to file an amended complaint. (Transcript

14

of hearing, November 12, 1968).

Based

upon the record and the statute, the
plaintiff contends that the question was
merely one of procedure, as was stated by
Judge Day, did not go to the merits of the

case, and therefore, the Order entered by
the Court granting the defendant's Motion

to Dismiss, based upon th= above section,

which Order was entered on the 16th day of
December, 1968, was not an adjudication
on the merits, was not a dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, and
plaintiff had a right to file an Amended Complaint.

It is plaintiff's further

contention that by virtue of the pronouncements of the Court as set forth in the
above cited record, permission was granted
to the plaintiff to file an Amended Compl'
!1 a1nt,
and that such permission was proper
I

II and

that this Court should allow the Second

15

Amended Complaint to stand.

And that the

same would be in accordance with the
purpose of Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, governing Amendments.
And in the spirit of the rule as defined
by this Court in the case of Gillman -vs-

Hansen,

----Utah

2d,

----

P2d

(1971) (Green Sheets--Case No. 12299).
Quoting from the opinion:
"Ordinarily the allowance of an
amendment by leave of court is a
matter which lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court. This
discretion however, is to be exercised
in the furtherance of justice and
must not be exercised so as to defeat
justice. The rule in this State has
always been to allow amendments
.
freely where justice requires, and
especially is this true before trial."
4.

The Honorable C. Nelson Day, on

the 12th day of November, 1968, trade the

following pronouncements from the bench:
"I see no reason why you can't file
an Amended Complaint in this particular action. The Motion to Dismiss

16

goes to your pleadings. I won't
preclude you from filing an Amended
p,leading as to these people •••• " and
'you can re-file as to them, arrl take
suggestions we have talked about here
this morning. I am not going to
prevent you from doing that •••• "
(Transcript of hearing of November
12, 1968, page 5).
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
" .••• Otherwise a party may amend his
pleading only by le ave of court ••••
and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires •••• "
In this ffi3.t ter it is plaintiff's con tent ion

. that the Order of the Honorable J. Harlan

1

Burns, District Judge, granting each of
the defendant's Motions to Dismiss the

Second Amended Complaint was a manifest
abuse of the discretion of the Court and
was directly contrary to the spirit and

rule number 15 as set forth above.
By virtue of that Order, the plaintiff's
herein were denied their day in Court.

17

Such an application of the rules would

deteat rather than promote justice.
Providing technicalities

eliminate

these plaintiff's from having their proper

day in Court.

In this matter, the plaint-

iff's have suffered serious and substantial
injuries and should be al lowed to pre sent
their claim before a court or a jury, and
there to pursue such legal remedies as

our laws provide.

18

granting" and "interest of justice"
provision of the Rules of Procedure, am
would constitute a manifest abuse of the
Courts discretion.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's conclude that the trial
i courts Orders granting the defendant's

several Motions to Dismiss were not correctly made and rever sable error and should be
reversed by this court.

That the matter

. should be remanded to the trial court with
mstructions directing the entry of the
plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint as a
pleading in this matter with further instructions that the defendants, State of Utah
and Nephi City Corporation should be re-

quired to file their answers, and be joined
as parties to the issues alleged in said
Second Amended Complaint.

19

That costs be

awarded

to tre parties.
Respectfully submitted,
MILTCN T. HARMON

Nephi, Utah

84648

Attorney for Appellants
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